INTRODUCTION
For centuries both philosophers of science and scientists have challenged the use of metaphor in scientific discourse (Hoffman, 1980a,b) , but a close look at this discourse reveals metaphor as a vital and necessary tool in developing scientific terminologies and hypotheses.
I will begin my examination of metaphor in scientific discourse, with definitions: Simply put, metaphor is an implicit analogy of two unlike things.
I.A. Richards (1936) refers to these two unlike parts of the metaphor as the "tenor," the primary subject, or the thing being described, and the "vehicle," which is the secondary subject or what the primary subject is being compared with. For example, in the metaphor "the moon is a pumpkin," moon is the tenor (primary subject), and pumpkin is the vehicle (secondary subject).
Then, "what is scientific discourse?" James Kinneavy provides a definition in terms of discourse based on its referential "aim" (1971) in the study of scientific principles. In discussing referential discourse, Kinneavy identifies three types:
informational, exploratory, and scientific.
Informational discourse presents a comprehensive discussion of a subject. Exploratory discourse explores a problem and tentative solutions or an issue
and possible beliefs entailed in a subject. Scientific discourse posits and supports, either inductively or deductively, a hypothesis about a subject. My focus is on scientific writing, although what I consider can be applied to informative and exploratory discourse as well.
Each type of referential discourse has its own style, but the stylistic features of scientific, informative, and exploratory discourse have strong similarities. According to Kinneavy, "'Objectivity' is the great virtue of scientific style." Most of the semantic and grammatical properties of this style, in fact, stem from the "objectivity of science, the attempt to reproduce reality as accurately as possible." Referential discourse as a whole is "reality-dominated," and features a "plain" style.
Metaphor, however, has traditionally been associated with what Kinneavy terms the "literary aim"
in which language calls attention to itself, an aim in apparent opposition to that of referential discourse.
Because the goal of the scientific researcher is to approach truth by developing accurate hypotheses and verifiable results in terms of objective reality, the language used in science must be clear and easy to interpret. There fore f igura ti ve language, including metaphor, has been eschewed in theory by many philosophers of science, even though in practice scientists themselves often use metaphor in their writing. As noted by Richard Honeck and Robert Hoffman (1980) And c. c. Anderson (1964 , cited in Hoffman, 1980a writes that in the modern age, as scientific and technical advances were made, metaphor was "classified as an embellishment designed to dupe the unwary."
This paper challenges the long-standing philosophical objections to using figurative language in referential discourse. Specifically, it posits theoretical justifications for using metaphor in scientific writing, addresses lingering concerns regarding the use of metaphor, and then examines a select body of scientific writing to evidence and characterize the place of metaphor in such discourse.
THE FUNCTIONS OF METAPHOR IN SCIENTIFIC DISCOURSE
Despite the allegations against figurative language, metaphor is helpful, at times essential, in performing three functions: establishing terminologies, expressing abstract concepts, and developing hypotheses.
Metaphor in Scientific Terminology
Metaphor's role in scientific terminology has been a particular concern of philosopher Richard Boyd.
According to Boyd, metaphor can perform the vital catachretic function of developing terminology where none before existed (Boyd, 1979 For these writers of scientific discourse, then, metaphor is certainly more than mere ornament.
Whether replaceable by literal language or theory constitutive, metaphor is has been established as a way of developing scientific terminology.
Metaphor in Abstract Expression
As well as helping to establish terminologies, metaphor facilitates abstract expression. For example, one metaphorical notion which incorporates a nonmetaphorical concept is "more is up."
When we make a statement such as "you made a high number of mistakes," or "my income rose last year," we are using our nonmetaphorical, spatial orientation to say something about mistakes or income. It is as if we were able to stack the mistakes or the dollars from the ground up, so that more would make a higher stack and fewer would make a lower stack. It is equally common to say "the number of your errors is quite low," or "my income fell last year."
Ontological metaphors, which give entity status to something which does not inherently have such status, also incorporate nonmetaphorical concepts. We might say "it's difficult to put my ideas into words," or "try to pack more thought into fewer words," indicating that we consider ideas as things or entities, and words as the containers for them. Another "container" for ideas is the mind. Consider such familiar sentences as "I can't get the tune out of my mind," "his brain is packed with interesting ideas," and "I need to clear my 
Metaphor in Hypothesis-building
Metaphor is also essential to scientists for expanding their understanding of the universe, or of those things which they cannot, perhaps never will be able to, experience with their five senses, such as particle physics, or the cognitive characteristics of the human brain. It is as important for hypothesisbuilding as it is for abstract expression. In fact, we can draw a direct correlation between hypothesisbuilding and the processes by which psychologists say we expand our knowledge. •
CONCERNS ABOUT METAPHOR IN SCIENCE
Having discussed metaphor in scientific terminology, abstract expression, and hypothesisbuilding, I will address two lingering concerns about using metaphor in science: 1) that it is difficult to understand, and 2) that it lacks "truthfulness" (Hoffman, 1980b} .
The Cognitive Qualities of Metaphor
Compared with literal language, metaphor is often thought more vague or ambiguous and difficult to understand (Harris, Lahey, and Marsalek, 1980} . Now individuals in the new discipline of cognitive science (which combines linguistics, philosophy, computer science, and psychology to study artificial and natural cognition} are studying metaphor to assess its cognitive qualities--how quickly, easily and accurately it is understood, how well it is remembered, and how much information it can carry.
Psychologists believe that to comprehend metaphor readers must go through a two-step process, 1} deciding whether the passage is metaphorical, and 2} determining the meaning of the metaphor. In the first category, recognition memory, the researchers found no significant difference in recall between the metaphorical and the nonmetaphorical sentences, thus indicating that metaphorical language
is not inherently more difficult to understand and remember than literal language.
For the second category, imageability ratings, the results showed no obvious correlation between metaphor and imagery; in other words, despite the fact that we generally consider metaphors as image-producers and imagemaking an important mnemonic technique, imageability is not a good predictor of memorability.
We may conclude, therefore, that the memorability of metaphor comes from something other than its power as an image-producer.
In the third category, informativeness ratings, no significant difference was found between metaphorical and nonmetaphorical sentences in the amount of information they are able to convey. In one such study, conducted by Michael Johnson and Robert G. Malgady (1980, see also Malgady and Johnson, 1980) , 28 metaphors and similies were taken from a breadth of literary sources and presented to college undergraduates to evaluate as "good" or "bad" based upon the student's own nonexpert criteria. The conclusion was that metaphors with a greater apparent similarity between topic and vehicle, e.g., "The snow this morning was like white confetti picked up by the wind," were considered easier to understand and more satisfying than those with a more opaque similarity, e.g., "Your smile was a warm wind." Perceived goodness was translated, then, into shared properties or features between tenor and vehicle. It is here that Roger Tourangeau (1982) also sees the separation between good metaphors and bad ones. He states, Among a host of other factors, agreement between the metaphor's picture and our own and incongruence between domains seems to contribute to our liking for a metaphor. Disagreement produces one sort of novelty--new beliefs--and incongruence another sort--a new structure for our beliefs"(l982).
However, the shared similarities between tenor and vehicle must fall into a middle ground between "literalness" and "nonsense" to be understandable and satisfying to the reader, according to a study done by Malgady (1975, cited in Malgady and Johnson, 1980) . In other words, when comparing three levels of phrasing, "Robes are justice" (figurative), "Robes are garments"
( 1 i teral), and "Robes are trucks" (nonsense As a caution we should note that because serious scientific study of metaphor and its role in the cognitive process has only just begun, little can be conclusively stated. Malgady and Johnson (1980) emphasize that theoretical asssumptions about metaphor are still sketchy, and argue that more discussion is Just as scientists must carefully choose literal language to convey the intended meaning, so metaphor must be carefully fashioned to be effective. In light of these studies, there is no basis for the theoretical exclusion of metaphor from scientific discourse on the ground that it is difficult to understand.
The Truthfulness of Metaphor
A final common objection to metaphor in science is that it does not provide the precision, objectivity and truthfulness required of scientific writing. To this one could ask two questions: 1) Is there is such a thing as linguistic precision and any way to avoid referential ambiguity? and 2) Do scientific theories represent the truth?
In regard to the first question, Boyd (1979) suggests that if metaphor seems to be too imprecise for theory construction, we have a faulty view of the precision by which scientific referencing takes place.
There are two major hypotheses on the manner in which reference is fixed in scientific and everyday discourse. Empirical theory states that most general terms are true by stipulation; the meanings are fixed in advance of their use. According to the opposing ostensive view, reference comes about by interaction between the users of the terms and the instances to which they belong. In empiricism, terms must be clearly and explicitly defined before use to avoid vagueness and imprecision--changes in theories almost always come from alterations in the subject matter or from the conceptual framework rather than from new discoveries. The ostensive account, on the other hand, is that terms are fixed nondefinitially with accommodation taking place as more is discovered. Both approaches to referencing leave room for ambiguities.
In empiricism, the terms are clearly defined but are of undetermined accuracy, and there is no accommodation for new discoveries. In ostension, the terms are nondefinitional, therefore ambiguous, but there is accommodation for new discoveries.
Regarding the question of whether metaphor represents the truth, Hoffman (1980b) notes that scientists themselves will admit that theories are not really the TRUTH. Not that they are wrong, really, or they could be replaced by a more acceptable theory, but they are not entirely true, either. For example, the definition of a "quark" in physics as a "particle" is itself metaphorical because a quark has no spacial extension. When physicists speak of the constituents of a quark, they describe them as "pointlike (structureless)." And the movement attributed to quarks is again expressed metaphorically; quarks are said to "spin," even though the movement referred to is not a rotational one, but an "angular" momentum.
It has been said that metaphor "masks" the truth.
According to Hoffman (1980b) , if metaphor masks the truth it is because of "flabby theorizing" on the part of the researcher. If a researcher takes the metaphor too literally, it can hide the truth. For example, if the statement that elementary particles "feel" a force is taken to mean that they feel in ways similar to a human being, that is the fault of the researcher, who should use the metaphor heuristically rather than definitionally. If used properly, metaphor can be helpful in pointing the way to possible characteristics of the subject under study.
METAPHOR IN SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH: A CASE STUDY
The first part of this study has established metaphor as theoretically important to the development of scientific terminology, to the expression of abstract concepts, and to the processes of accommodation and assimilation in research. The second part will test these functions through a case study designed to discover how metaphor is used in a select area of scientific writing.
Procedures: For the purposes of this study, (Falke et al, 1985) , a ghost was the metaphorical expression for an emptied cell, which has a filmy look. Similarly, in
Manson's article about the uptake of maltose (a sugar) in bacteria (Manson et al., 1985) , The value of metaphor in the presentation of a hypothesis was especially apparent in the data in the term ping-pong transport cycle (Falke et al., 1985) , used to describe an as yet unproven hypothesis of the pattern by which chloride passes in and out of a cell.
In this instance the popular game of ping-pong provides a term for a biochemical process. According to the hypothesis, a protein within the cell wall metaphorically paddles the chloride back and forth across the membrane net. The ping-pong metaphor is useful for describing the process, and it may also help further the hypothesis, for it may point the way to analagous principles operating in purportedly analagous situations. In another two cases, metaphor may at one time have been helpful in presenting a hypothesis which the current articles assumed to have been established: 1) bacteria grow in groups, or colonies (Snider et al., 1985) and 2) polypeptide takes the linear form of a chain (Mukku and Stancel, 1985) . Before anything was known about bacteria and polypeptide, these associations with known entities could have been helpful for visualizing and presenting a hypothesis which subsequently gained acceptance.
While only the ping-pong metaphor was theory constitutive in the absolute sense, all the metaphors certainly were more than mere ornament in that they provided for at least one, sometimes two or all three of the functions--terminology, abstract expression, and hypothesis-formation and presentation.
This case study supports the theory that metaphor provides a way to express an idea which cannot be otherwise expressed. It provides for terms and abstract expressions, and it helps visualize, present, perhaps even form, hypotheses.
Finally, my analysis of the data also indicated that the metaphors themselves often lose some of their power of analogy and take on a literal meaning through extended use. For example, when the term polypeptide chain (Mukku and Stance!, 1985) was first used fifty years ago, it probably helped scientists envision the shape of a polypeptide, something they could not see.
Today, knowledgeable scientists no longer focus on the physical similarities between a neckchain and a polypeptide chain; the term has become less a description than a name. Thus, polypeptide chain has evolved from a figurative to a literal meaning.
Furthermore, the study highlighted the degree of borrowing extant between scientific and nontechnical language. Ping-pong transport cycle (Falke et al., 1985) , cell ghosts (Falke et al., 1985) , toluene-based cocktail (Manson et al., 1985) , popypeptide chain (Mukku and Stance!, 1985) , triggering of uterine growth (Mukku and Stance!, 1985) , and cell population (Snider et al., 1985) are all scientific terms rooted in nontechnical language. Possibly, heavily-used scientific terms which originated in nontechnical language will again migrate back into nontechnical usage, albeit with changes in meaning in accordance with changes in audience and aim of discourse.
Thus, in addition to affirming the theoretical functions of metaphor presented earlier in the paper, the study suggests changes in it meanings at two levels.
One change is between literal and figurative.
Another is between nontechnical and scientific language.
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
A thorough study should be done of metaphor in a cross-section of disciplines. By studying in depth and comparing metaphor in the physical, biological, and social sciences we can determine if a given discipline This study provides a suggestion of the variety of metaphor which might be found in science writing.
Popular metaphor, he says, includes riddles (e.g., the moon is a pumpkin in a meadow), folk expressions and proverbs (e.g., bring home the bacon), cliches (e.g., jump the gun), literal words (what we consider dictionary meanings often originated through metaphorical reference, e.g., a door is an entrance to a room; it is also an opportunity, for education or a career), and slang (e.g., eat's pajamas). Literal comparisons, such as "the explosion produced a crater seven football fields long and three football fields And special thanks go to my husband and best friend, Rich, who has believed in me even in the most difficult times.
